Ideological Voting "Space"
As discussed on the "Legislative Polarity" page, Political Scientists are interested in the extent to which members of legislative bodies vote along partisan or ideological lines. In the 1940s and 1950s, a common theme in discussions of party politics, especially Congressional politics, was a concern that parties were not "responsible": that is, that the parties too often did not distinguish themselves from each other in terms of platforms and policy platforms. This led to the "responsible parties" movement within Political Science, which encouraged the parties to highlight their differences, so that voters would know, when choosing candidates for public office, which party was more in line with the voters' preferences on various issues. As Poole and Rosenthal discovered (see the "Legislative Polarity" page for a discussion of their work), starting in the mid-1970s, the Congressional parties gradually became more polarized to the point where there has become little to no "crossover" voting in Congress. Political Scientists now worry about the opposite problem: that Congressional voting has become TOO polarized, to the point where compromise seems no longer possible on a large array of issues.
As discussed also on the "Legislative Polarity" page, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty have begun to explore the same phenomenon in state legislatures. As their 2011 article (and Shor's continuing tracking of voting trends on the American Legislatures page) shows, the state legislatures vary in their party and ideological polarization (my own Legislative Polarity page shows a sharp difference between the more polarized Minnesota House and the less-polarized North Dakota chambers). However, as noted on my discussion of North Dakota, one of the big limitations to the way that we "measure" these differences is that we're assuming that partisanship and/or ideology can be measured on a linear scale (a straight line with "Left" or "Democrat" on one end, and "Right" or "Republican" on the other). When legislative bodies are almost perfectly polarized (for example, the California Assembly, or the current Congress), then this distinction is perhaps less significant, since, nearly all of the time, members of parties align with each other on roll call votes. As I noted in regards to Minnesota, through the first 35 votes of the 2015 session, there were over 60 Republican House members who voted exactly the same on every bill.
However, when looking at a less partisan Legislature, such as North Dakota, giving a single numerical value to each member (as I did on that table on the Polarity page), has its limitations. Of the 464 contested votes used to measure Polarity in the North Dakota House in the 2015 session, very few of them fell along straight party lines (I didn't count them, but as I was coding each vote, I was struck by how few straight-party [71-23] votes there were). Rather, there were many occasions where some of the more "moderate" Republicans would "cross over" and align with the entire Democratic caucus. There were others where a small group of Republicans (usually the more fiscally conservative or libertarian-leaning members) would vote in opposition to the larger Republican membership, with most Democrats aligned with the latter. On still other occasions, some of the libertarian group would vote against the majority of Republicans for philosophical reasons, and be joined by the minority Democrats. With this variety of voting patterns at play, a simple linear scale can't do justice to the variety of voting alliances that formed on various issues.
As discussed also on the "Legislative Polarity" page, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty have begun to explore the same phenomenon in state legislatures. As their 2011 article (and Shor's continuing tracking of voting trends on the American Legislatures page) shows, the state legislatures vary in their party and ideological polarization (my own Legislative Polarity page shows a sharp difference between the more polarized Minnesota House and the less-polarized North Dakota chambers). However, as noted on my discussion of North Dakota, one of the big limitations to the way that we "measure" these differences is that we're assuming that partisanship and/or ideology can be measured on a linear scale (a straight line with "Left" or "Democrat" on one end, and "Right" or "Republican" on the other). When legislative bodies are almost perfectly polarized (for example, the California Assembly, or the current Congress), then this distinction is perhaps less significant, since, nearly all of the time, members of parties align with each other on roll call votes. As I noted in regards to Minnesota, through the first 35 votes of the 2015 session, there were over 60 Republican House members who voted exactly the same on every bill.
However, when looking at a less partisan Legislature, such as North Dakota, giving a single numerical value to each member (as I did on that table on the Polarity page), has its limitations. Of the 464 contested votes used to measure Polarity in the North Dakota House in the 2015 session, very few of them fell along straight party lines (I didn't count them, but as I was coding each vote, I was struck by how few straight-party [71-23] votes there were). Rather, there were many occasions where some of the more "moderate" Republicans would "cross over" and align with the entire Democratic caucus. There were others where a small group of Republicans (usually the more fiscally conservative or libertarian-leaning members) would vote in opposition to the larger Republican membership, with most Democrats aligned with the latter. On still other occasions, some of the libertarian group would vote against the majority of Republicans for philosophical reasons, and be joined by the minority Democrats. With this variety of voting patterns at play, a simple linear scale can't do justice to the variety of voting alliances that formed on various issues.
Voting Factions in the ND House
The graphs below are an attempt to capture some of those alliances, in spatial form. As was mentioned on the Polarity page, for each member of the House, I created, in an Excel spreadsheet, a table which calculated the percentage of time that a member agreed with each of the other 93 members (however, because Rep. Bob Frantsvog missed most of the 2015 session due to health issues, I've eliminated his votes from this analysis). For example, Representative Bert Anderson (R-Crosby) agreed with Rep. Dennis Johnson (R-Devils Lake) on 85.7% of all contested roll call votes (his highest level of agreement with anyone in the chamber). His level of agreement with Rep. Gary Sukut (R-Williston) was the same (85.7%), but only 85.4% with Curt Hofstad (R-Devils Lake), and so on (Anderson's lowest level of agreement [41.7%] was with Rep. Kris Wallman, D-Fargo). For each member, then, one could make a list of their level of agreement with every other member. The highest level of agreement between any two members is 93.1% (the two Devils Lake members: Hofstad and Johnson). The lowest level (indicating the highest amount of disagreement) was 21.9% (between Gail Mooney [D-Cummings] and Ben Koppelman [R-West Fargo]).
For each member, I then calculated a "Top Ten" list; that is, the ten members with whom they agreed the most often (for some members, this list had eleven or twelve names on it, if there was a tie for tenth place). There was a fairly wide variance in how high a percentage one had to consider in order to make this "Top Ten" list: for Hofstad (the Devils Lake legislator mentioned above), he agreed with ten legislators at a level of at least 83.1%. However, Reps. Tracy Boe (D-Mylo) and Tom Beadle (R-Fargo) only agreed with ten other legislators at a level of at least 70.3%. In the series of graphs below, each box represents a North Dakota House member (Republicans are in Red, Democrats in Blue). A black line between two boxes indicates that one of those members was on the other's "Top Ten" list. Double black lines between the same pair of boxes indicates that each was on the other's "Top Ten" list. Representative Bert Anderson (R-Crosby) is in the center because had the most "Top Ten" connections of any member.
For each member, I then calculated a "Top Ten" list; that is, the ten members with whom they agreed the most often (for some members, this list had eleven or twelve names on it, if there was a tie for tenth place). There was a fairly wide variance in how high a percentage one had to consider in order to make this "Top Ten" list: for Hofstad (the Devils Lake legislator mentioned above), he agreed with ten legislators at a level of at least 83.1%. However, Reps. Tracy Boe (D-Mylo) and Tom Beadle (R-Fargo) only agreed with ten other legislators at a level of at least 70.3%. In the series of graphs below, each box represents a North Dakota House member (Republicans are in Red, Democrats in Blue). A black line between two boxes indicates that one of those members was on the other's "Top Ten" list. Double black lines between the same pair of boxes indicates that each was on the other's "Top Ten" list. Representative Bert Anderson (R-Crosby) is in the center because had the most "Top Ten" connections of any member.
The reader will notice that certain "clusters" of members can be discerned from looking at the chamber in this format.
First, in the very center of the graph, in the inner circle (especially on the left side of that circle), we have what might be called the "Core" of the Republican caucus:
First, in the very center of the graph, in the inner circle (especially on the left side of that circle), we have what might be called the "Core" of the Republican caucus:
Following the circle clock-wise, from the bottom left (Vigesaa) up through about the two-o-clock position (Gary Sukut), and including Anderson in the center, this group tends to be the most likely to vote on the prevailing side on most votes. Very few of them are thought to be "moderate" or "liberal" by even the most conservative members of the caucus, yet most of them can be found, depending on the issue, voting in agreement with the moderate GOP wing, and even some Democrats.
Above that Republican "core", we find a couple of clusters that might be termed mostly "Moderately Conservative" Republicans. The group on the left (Boehning through Larson) aligns on some issues with the "Core" group; on others, they are more likely to vote more in line with the more Conservative-Libertarian faction. The group on the right (Porter through Looysen) also often finds common group with the "Core" group, but also, on occasion, agrees as well with the more "Moderate" faction of the party. Rep. Roscoe Streyle (R-Minot) is an outlier on this chart, finding common agreement with some members of both sub-groups, as well as more outwardly Libertarian group (discussed below).
Outside of the "Core" GOP group on the left side, we find what might be called the "Conservative" and "Conservative-Libertarian" groupings. Immediately to the left of the "Core" circle is a group best described as a traditionally conservative (from Kreidt down through Rohr and Bellew). Especially on social issues, and most fiscal questions as well, this group is most likely to vote for the traditional Republican platform of traditional social mores and lower levels of government spending. On occasion, some members of this group will align with other factions in order to accomplish a desired policy outcome (especially the passing of appropriations budgets, which must be accomplished within the 80-day constitutional limit). Some members near the bottom of this chart (especially Jeff Delzer (R-Underwood) and Larry Bellew (R-Minot), both of whom are considered amongst the most fiscally conservative members of the Appropriations Committee) can also be found, at times, aligned with the more Libertarian group on the bottom.
That group at the very bottom of this sub-graph (Schatz through Rick C. Becker) represents what might be termed the "Conservative-Libertarians" or "Libertarians" (although none are members of that particular political party). On questions of government authority, including on some social issues, they are more likely to vote against the majority Republican caucus; however, on fiscal issues, most tend to side with the majority of the Conservative sub-group (except at the very end of the session, when many of the large budget bills are being passed: in cases where there is opposition to large budget increases, it is the members of this group who are most often found in the "Nay" column). Reps. Roger Brabandt (R-Minot) and Nathan Toman (R-Mandan) are outliers in this group: they tend to agree, depending on the issue, with different factions within the GOP caucus.
That group at the very bottom of this sub-graph (Schatz through Rick C. Becker) represents what might be termed the "Conservative-Libertarians" or "Libertarians" (although none are members of that particular political party). On questions of government authority, including on some social issues, they are more likely to vote against the majority Republican caucus; however, on fiscal issues, most tend to side with the majority of the Conservative sub-group (except at the very end of the session, when many of the large budget bills are being passed: in cases where there is opposition to large budget increases, it is the members of this group who are most often found in the "Nay" column). Reps. Roger Brabandt (R-Minot) and Nathan Toman (R-Mandan) are outliers in this group: they tend to agree, depending on the issue, with different factions within the GOP caucus.
On the right side of the Republican "Core" group, we find about fifteen members who might be termed "Moderate" or even "Liberal" Republicans. On the right side of the inner circle (Dennis Johnson through Jon Nelson), that group can be found often voting in concert with the "Core" group; however, on other issues (especially funding of social and educational services), they might vote more in agreement with the GOP members on the outer circle, as well as the Democrats. Outside of that inner circle, we find the members most often cited by their fellow Republicans (and many Democrats) as the "Liberal" faction within the party (Hawken, Beadle, Maragos, Kretschmar, and Mary Johnson). This group tends to have the highest levels of agreement (on average) with Democrats (in fact, three Democrats are on Rep. Kathy Hawken's [R-Fargo] "Top Ten" list). Reps. Bob Martinson (R-Bismarck) and Patrick Hatlestad (R-Williston) are the outliers on this sub-chart: depending on the issue, they might align with the "Core" GOP group, the "Moderate-Liberals", or even the more conservative factions.
The Democratic caucus, being much smaller (only 23 members in the 2015 session), does not have quite the number of actual factions found within the Republican caucus, but there are some distinctions found in their voting patterns. The large cluster in the center of this chart shows the majority of Democratic caucus, which tends, at least on issues of high contention between the parties, vote as a block. There are some outliers within this group (particularly Tracy Boe [Mylo] and Eliot Glassheim [Grand Forks], who both sit on the Appropriations Committee, and sometimes vote in alignment with the Republican members of that committee on budget issues). Ron Guggisberg (Fargo) also holds an Appropriations seat, and votes in agreement with Republicans on many budget issues, but he also tends to be aligned within the Democratic caucus most closely with other members from the Red River Valley (Mock, Hogan, Oversen, Boschee, Hanson, and Wallman). Within the Democratic caucus, Marvin Nelson (Rolla), Tracy Boe (Mylo), Lois Delmore (Grand Forks), Bob Hunskor (Newburg) and Alisa Mitskog (Wahpeton) tend to have the highest levels of agreement with Republicans.
Voting Factions in the ND Senate
As was mentioned in the discussion of the North Dakota Senate on the Legislative Polarity, there were significantly fewer contested roll-call votes in the Senate during the 2015 session (210 out of 850 votes, or 24.7%, as compared to 47.2% [464 out of 982] in the House). Like in the House, there were very few 32-15 (straight party-line) votes. However, there were fewer discernible patterns in the Senate. Many of the contested votes featured ten or fewer votes on the losing side, and there were few occasions where those in the minority could be discerned as commonly belonging to a particular faction (as was the case with the House, described above).
Like with the House, there's a "Core" group of Republican Senators:
Readers who compare the Partisan Polarity chart to this image will notice that, along the upper right side of this grouping, there's a cluster of Republican Senators (Holmberg, Flakoll, Krebsbach, Davison, Judy Lee, and Sorvaag) who are the most likely to vote in cooperation with Democrats (although there's less clarity and distinction in the groupings in the Senate, as compared to the House). The mass of this grouping functions in a way similar to the "Core" group that was identified in the House: its members (particularly in the center and left edge of this group) are the most likely to be in the majority on most roll-calls. The members on the bottom of this grouping (Schaible, Hogue, Wardner, and Anderson) vote, on occasion, with the more Conservative/Libertarian group, discussed below.
This group represents something of a distinct faction, although, especially in the upper part of the image, there are members who also vote often in alliance with some of the "Core" group. These members tend to vote, on certain social and fiscal issues, more in alliance with the traditional Republican platform, but there's less ideological cohesion amongst these group than amongst its counterpart in the House.
On the right side of larger chart is the Democratic caucus, which, like its GOP counterpart in the Senate, shows less cohesion on contested votes than in the House. The "core" Democratic group is smaller in the Senate (as a percentage of the larger caucus): the group in the middle right (Grabinger, Sinner, Schneider, Oban, Heckaman, Murphy, Nelson, and Marcellais) forms something of a core that tends to vote as a bloc, while those on the outer edges (especially along the outer left) tend to be the most likely to break with the majority (either to align with Republicans [the group on the bottom], or to vote as a stand-alone small bloc against the remainder of the chamber [the group on the top [Warner, Mathern, Axness] is most likely to exhibit this behavior]).